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After the Earthquake: 
Economic Governance 
and Mass Politics  
in the Middle East
By Steven Heydemann
the “dignity revolutions” of 2011 drew much of their momen-
tum from the smoldering anger of citizens across the Middle East about growing 
inequality and economic exclusion, deepening economic insecurity, the perva-
siveness of corruption, and the capture of economic liberalization programs 
by crony capitalists tightly linked to regime elites.1 If the specific triggers that 
transformed individual grievances into mass mobilization in January 2011 remain 
a matter of speculation, the economic discourse of the uprisings gave voice to 
insurgent demands for distributive justice and for the creation of an economic 
order that would repair the redistributive underpinnings of citizenship and of 
state-society relations. Western observers of the Arab uprisings tended to interpret 
the economic grievances of protesters as a response to corruption and the flawed 
implementation of liberalization programs. Yet a more radical critique of the 
economic practices of authoritarian regimes was evident in the signs and slogans 
of protesters, and among Arab intellectuals and civil society activists. Meeting 
in Cairo in May 2011, for example, the Arab NGO Network for Development 
(ANND) issued a declaration, “Towards a New Social Contract”, that linked 
popular demands for dignity to the establishment of a just social and economic 
1. United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, Survey of Social and Economic 





























































II — Critique internationale n° 61 – october-december 2013
order, and the creation of a state that supported solidarity among citizens and 
accepted economic security, employment, and social protection as fundamental 
rights.2 Appeals for social and economic democracy were thus inextricably linked 
to those for political freedom.
Today, as the so-called “Arab Spring” moves toward its fourth anniversary, the 
euphoria of 2011 has faded and economic grievances persist.3 Tunisia’s post-au-
thoritarian transition continues, with a peaceful transfer of power following 
elections in October 2014. Elsewhere in the region, however, regime transitions 
have either collapsed into violence, as in Libya and Yemen, or produced an intense 
authoritarian backlash. In July 2013, Egypt’s first democratically-elected president, 
Mohammed Morsi, was overthrown by the military following a new wave of mass 
protests. His ouster provoked deadly clashes between security forces and Morsi’s 
supporters, along with unprecedented suppression of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Syria’s protesters have been brutally repressed by the Assad regime, whose mas-
sive use of violence drove Syria into civil war and produced what the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees has called the worst humanitarian disaster since 
Rwanda in 1994. Bahrain’s uprising was also repressed, less violently but no less 
thoroughly, with the assistance of Saudi and Emirati troops. In both Bahrain and 
Syria, repression has intensified sectarian tensions and deepened social polarization.
No less important, the quality of economic life for the vast majority of people 
in the MENA region has not improved in the period since the start of the Arab 
uprisings. To be sure, MENA economies have been hard hit by the political turmoil 
associated with post-authoritarian transitions, the collapse of Syria’s economy, 
and the political and economic spillover of the Syrian conflict across the Levant. 
Nonetheless, the political openings of 2011 have not yet produced significant shifts 
in the underlying patterns of economic governance that defined the Middle East 
over the past several decades. Despite a region-wide surge in social spending in 
2011, the economic and social conditions that helped spark the Arab uprisings 
persist. The region’s economic trajectory thus offers an important if preliminary 
opportunity to assess the initial effects of the Arab uprisings on policymaking 
in a critical domain in both transitional regimes and authoritarian survivors. It 
also offers an opportunity to revisit claims about the crisis of authoritarianism 
in the Middle East, in particular claims that authoritarian regimes had become 
too brittle to adapt to the economic pressures that provoked a cascade of mass 
protests in late 2010 and early 2011.
2. Arab NGO Network for Development, “Toward a New Social Contract”, May 2011, (http://www.annd.
org/english/news.php?latestId=29). 





























































After the Earthquake: Economic Governance and Mass Politics in the Middle East — III
Economic Governance in the Wake of the Arab Spring
If, as Jack Goldstone has claimed, the survival strategies of “sultanistic dictators” 
in cases such as Tunisia and Egypt made those regimes “brittle, not resilient”, 
and helped create the conditions for revolution, we should expect to see variation 
in how “revolutionary” regimes and their authoritarian counterparts govern, 
especially with respect to economic policy.4 Notably, elected post-authoritarian 
governments should be expected to reorient economic policies to respond to the 
concerns of newly-empowered voters, reducing inequality and strengthening 
redistribution, while authoritarian survivors adhere to existing economic policies.5
This divergence between the two regime types is to be expected not only because 
free and fair elections in post-authoritarian countries create incentives for political 
leaders to be responsive to constituents, but also because of how inequality affects 
the prospects for democratic consolidation. As Boix and others have shown, there 
is a correlation between the level and intensity of inequality and regime type, with 
implications for how post-authoritarian leaders should structure economic policy 
if they hope to consolidate democracy.6 In transitional Arab regimes, renewing 
redistributive policies could have tempered popular demands for radical economic 
change, built support for incumbents and, if handled effectively, reassured the 
well-off that they would not be subject to predatory taxation.
How dramatically we should expect post-authoritarian economic policies to differ 
from those of authoritarian survivors is an important question. Caution in this 
regard is advisable. As Kienle makes clear in his contribution to this issue, the 
economic platforms of Islamist parties in Tunisia and Egypt, Ennhada and the 
Muslim Brotherhood, are broadly sympathetic to the hybrid but increasingly 
market-oriented development policies of their predecessors, tempered by more 
assertive claims of support for social welfare, redistribution, and economic secu-
rity.7 Nonetheless, as the first opposition parties voted into power in the Arab 
world in more than five decades, elected in no small part as a rejection of the 
economic policies of their predecessors, both Ennahda and the Egyptian Ikhwan 
faced strong incentives to differentiate their economic policies from those of the 
Mubarak or Ben Ali regimes.
4. Jack Goldstone, “Understanding the Revolutions of 2011: Weakness and Resilience in Middle Eastern 
Autocracies”, Foreign Affairs 90 (3), May-June 2011.
5. On the role of economic grievances in protest movements that preceded the Arab Spring, see Taylor Seybolt 
and M. Najeeb Shafiq, “Grievances, Opportunity and Protest in Four Arab States”, unpublished paper prepared 
for presentation at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 2012. Cited with 
permission. For Tunisian public opinion data on attitudes toward economic well being just prior to the outbreak 
of mass protests in January 2011, see Gallup World, “Analyzing the Dawn of the Arab Spring” (http://www.
gallup.com/poll/157049/tunisia-analyzing-dawn-arab-spring.aspx). 
6. Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
7. Jane Kinninmont, “‘Bread, Dignity and Social Justice’: The Political Economy of Egypt’s Transition”, 
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Some early indicators suggested that such variation in economic policies would 
indeed emerge. In 2011 and 2012, Islamist political parties in Egypt and Tunisia 
competed for votes on platforms that stressed economic justice and the imperative 
of addressing issues such as unemployment and the need to strengthen social 
welfare systems. Newly elected leaders in both countries affirmed their intent 
to eliminate the practices that provoked mass protests, create jobs, expand redis-
tributive programs, and target corruption and inequality.8 With future elections 
looming on the horizon, moreover, these transitional governments had powerful 
incentives to use economic policy to broaden political inclusion, improve social 
mobility, and mitigate the grievances that contributed to the overthrow of their 
predecessors. Conversely, with their continued existence at risk as a result of 
the Arab uprisings, authoritarian survivors might be expected to rely even more 
heavily on the economic tactics and tools that had kept them in power for so 
long, including the practices through which they purchased the loyalty of key 
constituencies and sustained patronage networks.9
At the risk of concluding too much too soon, however, a comparative assessment 
of regime responses to the Arab Spring indicates that elected transitional gov-
ernments pursued economic policies that differed little if at all from those of 
the authoritarian survivors – a category that includes a large majority of Middle 
Eastern cases.10 Nor does a comparison over time reveal any marked differences 
in this area. Across the region, elected governments and their authoritarian 
counterparts have adopted a strikingly similar mix of economic strategies, com-
bining redistribution and social provision, the use of economic side-payments to 
politically important constituents, and a continued commitment to reductions in 
social spending and programs of economic liberalization.11
Moreover, as both transitional and surviving authoritarian regimes struggle to 
balance rising demands for economic justice with the need to maintain policy 
environments that reassure local business interests, international investors, and 
international financial institutions (IFIs), they have been compelled to respond 
to external uncertainty about their commitment to market-oriented strategies of 
economic development. In some cases, including Tunisia, Morocco, and Jordan, 
8. In late 2011 following elections to a constitutional assembly, the leader of Tunisia’s ruling Islamist Ennahda 
Party, Rachid Ghannouchi, explicitly affirmed the intent of party leaders to seek control of ministries 
that would give the party a chance to demonstrate to Tunisians its ability to respond to popular concerns 
about employment, living standards, and prices. Meeting with Rachid Ghannouchi, US Institute of Peace, 
Washington, DC, December 11, 2011. 
9. Steven Heydemann (ed.), Networks of Privilege in the Middle East: The Politics of Economic Reform Reconsidered, 
New York, Palgrave, 2004.
10. See Toby Dodge, “Conclusion: The Middle East after the Arab Spring”, in After the Arab Spring: Power 
Shift in the Middle East?, LSE Ideas, SR011, May 2012, p. 64-68. 
11. Mohamed Hedi Bchir and Taoufik Rajhi, “Short Term Economic Responses to Unemployment in 
the Arab Region”, Paper presented at a UNESCWA Conference, Beirut, November 2012, (https://www.
gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?RecordID=4256). For one recent example of the 






























































After the Earthquake: Economic Governance and Mass Politics in the Middle East — V
social expenditures were reduced after an initial boost in early 2011. In others, 
notably Egypt, the fate of social spending emerged as a source of significant friction 
between the ruling Muslim Brotherhood and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF). Nervous about a popular backlash against reductions in social spending 
in the run-up to parliamentary elections, Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood refused 
to adopt conditions required by the IMF to secure a $4.8 billion loan agreement.
In general, and with the partial exception of Egypt during Morsi’s tenure, tran-
sitional regimes have largely resumed implementation of economic liberalization 
programs, austerity measures, and subsidy reductions. Authoritarian survivors in 
Jordan and Morocco have followed a similar path. In both countries, the resump-
tion of economic reforms in 2012 sparked new waves of protest. Only among the 
oil-exporting monarchies of the Arab Gulf, where vast capital surpluses make 
it possible to sustain expanded redistributive programs without jeopardizing 
economic fundamentals or international credit ratings, has there been no retreat 
from redistributive programs introduced since early 2011.
Convergence in Post-Arab Spring Economic Policy
This convergence in economic policies is noteworthy for a number of reasons. 
First, it reinforces longstanding arguments about the constraints on economic 
governance that confront all developing countries, without regard for regime 
type, in an era in which market-oriented liberalization has become a global norm 
and political barriers to the expansion of redistributive policies remain high. 
The continued commitment to market-oriented economic reforms on the part 
of regimes brought to power by mass uprisings that were, in part, animated by 
popular anger at the corrupt management of neoliberal development strategies, 
can be seen as evidence of the power that IFIs wield in their relationships with 
deeply indebted governments desperate to stave off fiscal collapse and surmount 
the spiraling downturn in local economies caused by years of political instability.
For elected transitional regimes in Egypt and Tunisia, dire economic conditions 
presented a daunting challenge. Failure to respond adequately to economic 
crisis endangered the survival of newly-empowered leaders and ruling par-
ties, eroded the “revolutionary legitimacy” of transitional governments, and 
undermined longer-term prospects for the consolidation of democracy. For 
authoritarian survivors the political calculus was slightly different but it yielded 
a similar result. Economic grievances are a catalyst for political mobilization 
that can rapidly escalate to become an existential threat. Tempering economic 
discontent and dissipating the drivers of protest require spending money now. 
Redistribution and a rebalancing of the priority attached to equity versus growth 
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Yet to the extent that redistributive policies represent an additional drain on already 
overstretched treasuries, and are viewed by potential investors and lenders as a 
return to the failed populist development strategies of the past, they diminish 
the prospects for a return to economic growth, erode the willingness of IFIs to 
lend, and diminish the confidence of foreign investors. In both transitional and 
authoritarian regimes, the resulting strategies of economic governance are similar: 
an initial shift toward redistribution is followed by the resumption, grudging in 
some cases, of economic liberalization programs aimed at reassuring IFIs and 
international investors that Arab governments accept the imperatives of mar-
ket-oriented economic reforms. Even if transitional regimes initially celebrated 
the reappearance of mass politics, they, like their authoritarian counterparts, 
moved quickly to contain political mobilization and limit the effects of politics 
from below. This should come as no surprise. Almost 30 years ago, O’Donnell 
and Schmitter, in their seminal work, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule, noted 
the incentives that lead political parties during transitional periods to “show 
themselves to be not only, or not so much, agents of mobilization as instruments 
of social and political control”. This was certainly the case for the Freedom and 
Justice Party in Egypt, and even more so for the current regime of President Sisi.12
Second, convergence serves as a useful reminder of the “normalization” of Arab 
political economies, and the extent to which the pressures they confront have 
come to resemble those that are shaping public debates over economic gov-
ernance in virtually every region of the world. In reigniting struggles over the 
trade-offs between equity and growth, giving new political weight to critiques 
of economic liberalization, and opening up possibilities for the revitalization 
of social welfare and redistributive economic policies, the Arab Spring stands 
out as an especially powerful instance of the anti-austerity protest movements 
that followed the global financial crisis of 2008.13 Cairo and Tunis, as well as 
Amman, Algiers, Manama, and Sana‘a, differ from Athens, Madrid, Lisbon, 
and New York only in the scale and intensity of social protests sparked by a 
global backlash against growing inequality, economic marginalization, and 
economic insecurity.
The convergence we see at the regional level is thus an indicator of more encom-
passing processes at work on a global scale, with important implications for debates 
about regime type, variation in regime survival strategies, and authoritarian 
resilience. Such processes help to explain why the divergence in economic policies 
between elected transitional regimes and authoritarian survivors is smaller than 
might be expected. By creating incentives and constraints that affect survival 
12. Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions 
about Uncertain Democracies, Washington, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986, p. 58.
13. UNESCWA, “Towards a New Welfare Mix: Rethinking the Roles of the State, Market, and Civil Society 






























































After the Earthquake: Economic Governance and Mass Politics in the Middle East — VII
strategies across regime types, countervailing domestic and international economic 
pressures have constrained the autonomy of all Middle Eastern governments with 
respect to economic policy choices. Across regime types, the Arab Spring has 
caused Middle Eastern governments to calibrate popular demands for economic 
justice and increased redistribution against countervailing pressures that have 
steered them back toward a focus on growth and a preference for economic sta-
bility over social transformation, despite the political risks this entails.
Third, while international pressures have contributed to convergence in economic 
policy, powerful domestic factors have also played an important role. Across 
the region, mass protests placed ruling coalitions under stress, threatening the 
economic and political interests of those who benefited most under authoritari-
anism. In every case, this included crony capitalists and their political sponsors, 
the broader networks of business actors who depend on regime patronage to 
protect their economic privileges, and, in the Egyptian case in particular, the 
senior officers who control the military’s economic interests. Yet other than in 
Libya, in every case in which an authoritarian incumbent was ousted, the Arab 
Spring did little to disrupt embedded interests: across the region, “winners” have 
survived the mass uprisings of 2011.
The reasons for this are straightforward: the Arab Spring is not (or is not yet) the 
transformational moment that many hoped it would become. With the exception 
of Libya, every instance in which an incumbent was overthrown resulted not 
from systemic authoritarian breakdown but from processes of “decapitation” that 
occurred through the explicit renegotiation of the terms of established ruling bar-
gains, leaving the vast majority of the beneficiaries of the old regime untouched.14 
These outcomes may not have reflected the preferences of opposition leaders or 
of the protestors they claimed to represent. Yet given the economic and political 
conditions under which transitions were negotiated they are not surprising.
Leadership transitions in the Middle East can thus be understood as the product 
of elite pacts familiar to any reader of the transitology literature. Yet because elite 
bargaining occurred in the context of regime decapitation rather than regime 
breakdown, established elites wielded considerable power. Under conditions of 
economic crisis and intense political mobilization, and with weak, inexperienced, 
and fragmented oppositions, bargaining was heavily constrained by the need 
to accommodate the economic interests of potential spoilers, especially in the 
military and security services, and to provide assurances of economic stability 
to beneficiaries of the old order as well as the large majorities in the Arab would 
which had not participated in mass protests.15
14. Hazem Kandil, “Why Did the Egyptian Middle Class March to Tahrir Square?”, Mediterranean Politics, 
17 (2), 2012.
15. On the effects of economic crisis on democratization see Stephan Haggard and Robert R. Kaufman, The 
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Among the authoritarian regimes that have thus far weathered the protest 
movements of the Arab Spring – the large majority of cases in the Middle East 
– the strategic dilemmas confronting regime elites were similar: how to manage 
competing economic interests to preserve the underlying stability of the system. 
The challenge has been to preserve the cohesion of existing ruling coalitions 
while using social policy to mitigate popular economic grievances. In these cases, 
as well, the response of authoritarian regimes was not to abandon the mixed 
economic strategies they have pursued since the late 1980s, but to make modest 
adjustments in existing policies to reduce their negative distributive effects, 
expand the boundaries of economic inclusion – at least temporarily – and shore 
up the legitimacy of regimes.
These initial bargains may not endure, either in transitional regimes or in 
authoritarian survivors. Their fragility is highlighted by the Egyptian and 
Yemeni experiences. In both cases, initial bargains have collapsed under pressure 
from two distinct sources: elite defection, on the one hand, and mobilized social 
groups, on the other hand, angered by how little their “revolutions” had changed 
the status quo. In both cases, moreover, the rapid failure of post-authoritarian 
pacts has generated intense debates about the persistence of the “deep state”, and 
equally intense suspicion of collaboration between authoritarian power centers 
in the military and intelligence apparatus and disaffected elements among the 
supporters of ousted autocrats.16 In Jordan, Tunisia, and Morocco, regimes have 
also faced persistent discontent with the limited measures they have taken to 
address economic grievances.
Despite their mixed track record, the emergent ruling bargains in the Arab 
world nonetheless point to the endurance of authoritarianism’s institutional and 
social legacies, the continuities that have constrained processes of democratic 
transformation, and the capacity of authoritarian survivors to adapt economic 
policies under conditions of economic and social stress to preserve their hold on 
power. Indeed, attention to the social and institutional origins of the Arab Spring 
is critical for an adequate understanding of how the legacies of earlier phases of 
Arab state building – periods in which redistributive social pacts became consol-
idated – shaped decision making in both transitional regimes and authoritarian 
survivors in 2011 and beyond.17
The unraveling of the institutional and policy frameworks that constituted these 
social pacts by Arab leaders beginning in the late 1980s crystallized in the late 
16. Yezid Sayigh, “Above the State: The Officer’s Republic in Egypt”, Carnegie Papers: Middle East, 
Washington, DC: The Carnegie Endowment, August 2012 (http://carnegieendowment.org/files/officers_
republic1.pdf ); Issandr El Amrani, “Sightings of the Egyptian Deep State”, Middle East Information and 
Research Project, January 1, 2012, (http://www.merip.org/mero/mero010112); Daniel Brumberg and Hesham 
Sallam, “The Politics of Security Sector Reform in Egypt”, Special Report No. 318, Washington, DC, US 
Institute of Peace, October 2012. 
17. Steven Heydemann, “Social Pacts and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Middle East”, in Debating 
Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Non-Democratic Regimes, Oliver Schlumberger (ed.), Stanford, 
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2000s as a major source of political vulnerability.18 By the 2000s, authoritarian 
regimes could no longer credibly claim to be the defenders of the redistributive 
commitments of their predecessors. Yet economic liberalization – managed with 
an eye toward the political benefits it could deliver for regimes – had not led to 
sufficient improvements in well being, employment, or economic opportunity 
to serve as an alternative source of legitimacy. For both transitional regimes and 
authoritarian survivors, these conditions framed the policy dilemmas that are 
evident in the patterns of economic governance that have begun to take shape 
post-2011. To remain politically viable regimes had to re-balance strategies of 
economic governance in response to mass protests.19 This had to be done while 
simultaneously responding to the demands of IFIs and investors who were 
themselves sympathetic to the concerns of protesters about economic insecurity, 
corruption and cronyism,20 but nonetheless sought assurances, often under the 
rubric of “inclusive development” or “growth-oriented reform” that economic 
governance would not privilege redistribution over markets.21 Attempts by Arab 
governments to balance these two sets of pressures have produced strategies of 
economic governance which, as noted above, exhibit only modest departures from 
the hybrid models that were common across the region prior to 2011. They reflect 
compromises that may be inadequate to address either popular expectations con-
cerning the role of the state as a provider of economic security or the expectations 
of IFIs and investors concerning commitments to growth-oriented reforms.22
Memories of Economic Justice and the Return of Redistribution
In the decade that preceded the Arab uprisings of 2011, economic liberalization, 
while partial and selective, opened new space for private sector actors to operate 
alongside, though often still in the shadow of, inefficient public sectors that none-
theless remained the largest employers in most Arab Mediterranean countries.23 
Economic reforms fostered deeper integration of Arab economies into global 
18. Fadhel Kaboub, “The Making of the Tunisian Revolution”, Middle East Development Journal, 5 (1), 2013. See 
also Ishac Diwan, “Introduction: The Political and Economic Transformations in the Arab World”, Middle East 
Development Journal, 5 (1), 2013. 
19. Ishac Diwan, “Understanding Revolution in the Middle East: The Role of the Middle Class”, Middle East 
Development Journal, 5 (1), 2013, p. 19.
20. See Joana Silva, Victoria Levin, and Matteo Morgandi, Inclusion and Resilience: The Way Forward for Social 
Safety Nets in the Middle East and North Africa, Washington, World Bank, September 2012 (https://openknowl-
edge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/12261/NonAsciiFileName0.pdf?sequence=).
21. See International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Middle East and Central Asia, November 2012, 
Washington: IMF, 2012, (http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2012/mcd/eng/pdf/mreo1112.pdf ). 
See also UNESCWA, “Report of the High-Level Meeting on Reform and Transitions to Democracy”, Beirut 
January 15-16, 2012, Beirut, ESCWA, 2012. 
22. Joana Silva, Victoria Levin, Matteo Morgandi, and Cynthia English, “MENA Residents Put Onus on 
Government to Help the Poor”, Gallup.com, November 27, 2012 (http://www.gallup.com/poll/158906/
mena-residents-put-onus-government-help-poor.aspx). 
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markets, even though integration remained low in comparative perspective. 
Trade agreements proliferated and foreign investment expanded. In turn, these 
links and the economic flows they helped to generate affected the structure and 
composition of production, benefiting sectors such as textiles and agricultural 
exports, tourism, services, and finance, while diminishing the importance of 
others, including local manufacturing and industrial sectors.
These changes transformed the political economies of the region, disrupting 
patterns of state-society relations that had become deeply consolidated through 
post-independence processes of state building, and destabilizing the economic 
security of the region’s most vulnerable social groups. They also modified the 
distribution of economic and political influence, creating new winners and losers, 
including among the elite patronage networks and clientelist frameworks that 
organize significant domains of economic activity.24 Labor market reforms in 
several Arab countries (notably Egypt, Tunisia, Jordan, Algeria, and Morocco) 
placed longstanding corporatist relations between organized labor and the state 
under pressure, giving new priority to private sectors, both as drivers of economic 
growth and as potential arenas within which to expand collective bargaining 
rights for workers.25
Even as demographic growth slowed in the Middle East, however, the employment 
gap in the region remained the largest in the world. In 2004, the World Bank 
estimated that the Arab countries would need to create some 100 million new jobs 
by 2020 to satisfy employment demand. Between 2003-2007, before the onset of 
energy and commodity price inflation in 2008, the economies of the Arab region 
grew rapidly. Job creation exceeded expectations.26 Yet even high levels of GDP 
growth during these years did not resolve the issues of rising unemployment, 
underemployment, and the flow of labor into the informal sector, where workers 
have almost no access to the benefits of social policy. By 2011, the exclusion of 
informal workers from access to social welfare had become systemic. These trends 
in job creation, and the persistence of a very large employment gap in the context 
of rising commodity prices and cuts in public spending, played a critical role in 
setting the stage for the Arab Spring and in shaping how Arab governments, both 
elected transitional governments and authoritarian survivors, responded to the 
systemic economic dysfunctions that fueled it.
These pre-Arab Spring reforms did more than just impose limited and selective 
processes of economic liberalization. Despite the persistence of populist rhetoric 
among Arab leaders, and despite patterns of public expenditure that continued 
24. See Melanie C. Cammett, Globalization and Business Politics in Arab North Africa: A Comparative Perspective, 
New York, Cambridge University Press, 2007.
25. Myriam Catusse, “The Economic Sector in Morocco”, in Laura Guazzone and Daniela Pioppi (eds), The 
Arab State and Neo-Liberal Globalisation: The Re-structuring of State Power in the Middle East, London, Ithaca 
Press, 2009.
26. The World Bank, Middle East and North Africa Region, 2007. Economic Developments and Prospects: Job 
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to devote large shares of GDP to social welfare (whether directly or indirectly), 
economic reforms raised critical questions about the commitment of Arab regimes 
to the redistributive and welfare-oriented frameworks of economic governance 
that had taken shape in the post-independence, post-colonial era. They posed 
a direct challenge to widely-shared conceptions of state authority and norms of 
economic security, as well as to the redistributive bases of state legitimacy that 
had defined state-society relations for almost five decades in much of the Arab 
world. Moreover, these processes acquired particular political salience, at least 
in part, because of the power of the collective memory among citizens about the 
capacity of states to effect social and economic change – a legacy of the successes of 
populist-redistributive economic strategies of the 1950s-1980s in improving social 
indicators across the board in the Arab world – and of the appropriate role of the 
state in the economy as a provider of economic security and distributive justice.27
Throughout the 2000s, popular memories of distributive justice emerged as a 
powerful source of collective action among labor, the urban poor, and the middle 
class, even in contexts in which political mobilization was tightly controlled by 
authoritarian regimes. Protests organized by workers and urban poor in Egypt 
from 2007-2010 – like earlier episodes of mass mobilization in Egypt in 1977 – 
represented more than the spontaneous flaring up of public anger over rising food 
and fuel costs. They were an appeal to regimes to honor obligations anchored in 
this enduring collective memory of the state as a provider of economic security 
and social protection. 28 The adoption by some Arab regimes, including pre-rev-
olution Syria, of terms such as the “social market economy” to characterize 
economic development strategies – even if the underlying policies were quite 
remote from the reality of a social market – underscore their awareness of this 
obligation and the constraints it imposed on their capacity to shift Arab political 
economies decisively toward market-based models of economic governance. In 
this way, economic governance post-2011 bears the imprint of earlier struggles 
between redistribution and growth.
Distributive Justice in the Wake of the Arab Spring
As mass protests swept across the region in early 2011, governments, without regard 
for regime type, deployed a wide range of strategies to mitigate the economic 
grievances of protesters, blunt protest movements, and shore up regime legitimacy. 
These included expanding subsidy programs, job creation schemes, investment 
in large-scale development projects to boost employment, increasing wages for 
27. Steven Heydemann, “Social Pacts and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Middle East,” in Debating 
Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Non-Democratic Regimes, Oliver Schlumberger (ed.), Stanford, 
Stanford University Press, p. 21-38.
28. Joel Benin, Justice for All: The Struggle for Worker Rights in Egypt, A Report of the Solidarity Center, 





























































XII — Critique internationale n° 61 – october-december 2013
public sector employees, direct cash transfers, reshuffling economic portfolios in 
governments to signal a concern for popular economic grievances, and, among 
the non-oil exporting governments in transition, appeals to the oil-exporting, 
capital-surplus regimes in the Arab Gulf for investment capital and loans.
In Algeria, for example, where the ruling military quickly suppressed an incipient 
protest movement, the government acted as early as February 2011 to increase 
subsidies on basic foodstuffs such as sugar and cooking oil, and indicated its 
intent to fund a $286 billion development program. In embattled Bahrain, with 
a population of just over 1.3 million, the ruling Al Khalifa family combined 
economic incentives with punitive measures targeting those participating in 
mass protests. In early 2011, the Al Khalifa pledged over $100 million in direct 
assistance to families most affected by rising commodity prices, and implemented 
a cash-transfer program that provided 1,000 Bahraini Dinar (about $2,700) to 
every family. The Gulf Cooperation Council, of which Bahrain is a member, 
pledged $20 billion toward a ten-year development plan targeting Bahrain and 
Oman. In Saudi Arabia, the government announced in February 2011 that it was 
allocating $37 billion for new public spending programs. This was followed in 
March of the same year by an additional commitment of $93 billion in welfare 
spending, housing construction, and employment creation, including some 60,000 
new jobs in the Ministry of Interior which is responsible for internal security. 
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates also used cash transfers and public spending 
programs to temper economic grievances and prevent the kind of mass protests 
then sweeping the region.
In Egypt and Tunisia, where newly-elected Islamist parties had for decades 
expressed positions in support of social and economic justice, governments pur-
sued similar strategies. In Egypt, planned subsidy reductions were suspended, 
support for food and fuel subsidies was increased, public expenditures on social 
provision expanded: housing, healthcare and education spending increased by 
39 percent, 17 percent and 9 percent, respectively.29 Civil servants were given a 
15 percent salary increase. Only weeks after his election in June 2012, President 
Morsi made his first official trip outside of Egypt, traveling to Saudi Arabia to 
request financial support. His visit resulted in an agreement to increase Saudi 
investment in Egypt by $27 billion. In Tunisia, government spending increased 
overall by almost eight percent between 2010 and 2012, the largest overall growth 
in public expenditure in the Middle East.30 From 2010-2011, government spend-
ing on food and other subsidies increased by 68 percent. Jordan and Morocco, 
29. OECD, “Socio-Economic Context and Impact of the 2011 Events in the Middle East and North Africa 
Region”, MENA-OECD Investment Programme, December 2011 (http://www.oecd.org/mena/invest-
ment/49171115.pdf ).
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two authoritarian monarchies seen as most vulnerable to the Arab Spring, also 
amplified public spending significantly. In Morocco, subsidy expenditures almost 
doubled from 3.6 percent to 6.1 percent of GDP. Jordan’s subsidy bill rose by a 
staggering 200 percent in 2011, as the Hashemite Monarchy increased its funding 
for subsidies on basic commodities and fuel, and increased public sector salaries. 
Both countries were also invited to apply for membership in the GCC, a patently 
political effort by the Gulf monarchies to bolster their counterparts however far 
removed they might be from the shores of the Gulf.
Subsidy Increases, 2010-201131
Subsidy expenditures as % of total expenditure
Sources: National Authorities, DB Research
Even as regimes propped up subsidy and social welfare systems, however, they 
also responded to domestic and international concerns about a populist turn 
among the governments brought to power on a wave of economic discontent – 
and, for Europe in particular, about the possibility that unrest in the southern 
Mediterranean would drive new waves of migrants into the European Union.32 
The uprisings of 2011 led both transitional regimes and authoritarian survivors 
to seek emergency financial support from Western governments, the European 
Union, Gulf monarchies, and international financial institutions, including the 
IMF (Egypt, Jordan, Morocco) and the World Bank (Tunisia). In May 2011, G-8 
governments with support from the European Union and the IMF/World Bank 
established the Deauville Partnership as a mechanism for coordinating interna-
tional support for Arab Countries in Transition (ACT): Egypt, Jordan, Libya, 
31. Ibid., p. 10. Reprinted with permission.
32. Speech by Cecilia Malmström, European Commissioner for Home Affairs, on “Responding to the Arab 
Spring and Rising Populism: The Challenges of Building a European Migration and Asylum Policy”, Harvard 
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Morocco, Tunisia, and Yemen.33 The initiative later established the Deauville 
Partnership Middle East and North Africa Transition Fund, which aimed to 
secure financing of $250 million to support economic measures that member states 
viewed as consistent with sound economic governance and the strengthening of 
democratic institutions.34
By early 2012, the rapid deterioration of economic conditions combined with 
pressure from international donors led virtually every ACT government to offset 
enhanced redistributive programs with steps to reduce government spending, 
bring down fiscal deficits, and improve the investment climate for both local and 
foreign investors. In August 2012, the IMF announced the approval of a “precau-
tionary and liquidity line”35 for Morocco of $6.2 billion and a 36-month Stand-By 
Agreement (SBA) with Jordan of $2 billion. These decisions were predicated on 
proposals from the governments of Morocco and Jordan to undertake (or continue) 
economic policies consistent with IMF guidelines stressing “socially acceptable 
fiscal consolidation” through subsidy adjustments as well as tax and fiscal policy 
reforms.36 By the end of the year, Morocco and Jordan, together with Tunisia, 
had cautiously reduced food and fuel subsidies, sparking renewed protests. In 
spring 2013, in response to commitments from the Tunisian government that it 
would act to reduce deficits, cut subsidies from 4.7 billion to 4.2 billion dinars – 
largely through further cuts to fuel subsidies – and undertake tax and fiscal policy 
reforms, the IMF announced that it had reached a “staff-level” agreement on a 
$1.78 billion SBA for Tunisia. Announcement of the reforms required to secure 
the emergency loan provoked “widespread public anger” and sparked a renewed 
round of protests and strikes across the country.37
In Egypt, the Morsi government’s retreat from redistribution was slower and more 
uneven. In the months following the removal of Hosni Mubarak from power, the 
IMF approached the leadership of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces 
(SCAF) to initiate negotiations over an emergency SBA. The head of the SCAF, 
Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, rejected these overtures, “reportedly 
because he was hesitant to burden Egypt with what he considered was too much 
foreign debt and perhaps believing that Egypt could receive short-term loans or 
33. See U.S. Department of State, “The Deauville Partnership with Arab Countries in Transition of the 
Meeting on Policies for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises”, November 8, 2012 (http://www.state.gov/r/
pa/prs/ps/2012/11/200330.htm). 
34. See “Overview”, Middle East and North Africa Transition Fund (http://www.menatransitionfund.org/
content/overview). 
35. The precautionary liquidity line is a new financial instrument of the IMF intended to assist governments 
with sound economic fundamentals respond to short-term economic vulnerabilities. The Moroccan PLL of 
August 2012 represented the first use of this new financial instrument. 
36. International Monetary Fund, “Transcript of a Conference Call on Jordan’s Stand-By Arrangement, 
Morocco’s Precautionary and Liquidity Line and the IMF’s Engagement in the Middle East and North Africa”, 
Washington, D.C., Friday, August 3, 2012 (http://www.imf.org/external/np/tr/2012/tr080312.htm).






























































After the Earthquake: Economic Governance and Mass Politics in the Middle East — XV
grants from Gulf Arab countries instead”.38 In late November 2012, the Egyptian 
government proposed a reform package to the IMF that included energy subsidy 
reforms, tax increases, deficit reductions, and increases in redistributive programs 
specifically targeting the poor, such as food subsidies. Despite the Morsi government’s 
claims that it would manage the economy to “achieve the intended targets of the 
January 25, 2011 revolution” with respect to economic security and citizen dignity, 
the plan bore a striking resemblance to the economic policies of the Mubarak era.39
As of May 2013, Egypt had still not agreed to IMF conditions for securing access 
to a $4.8b SBA that had been under negotiation for more than a year.40 Popular 
resistance to President Morsi’s centralization of power, the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
declining popularity, and the shadow of upcoming parliamentary elections led the 
Egyptian government to postpone a decision that his successor, President Sisi, 
has also navigated with considerable caution. Through the summer of 2013, on 
the eve Sisi’s coup, negotiations with the IMF continued and the Egyptian gov-
ernment persisted in resisting reductions in social spending, even as it proposed a 
package of reforms designed to increase state revenues, reduce fuel subsidies, and 
strengthen overall economic governance in a bid to reassure foreign investors.41
Conclusion: From Liberalization to Redistribution and Back Again
The Arab Spring is not over. Its full effects may not be felt for years. Yet within its 
brief history, the reversal of redistribution and a return to economic liberalization 
is a useful lens through which to assess contending claims about the resilience 
of authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. This shift, evident in transitional 
regimes and authoritarian survivors alike, highlights the constraining effects of 
both global markets and of authoritarian legacies – legacies that include not only 
popular memories of distributive justice that continue to drive citizens into the 
streets, but also the deeply institutionalized accommodations among authoritar-
ian elites that have thus far narrowed the possibilities for political and economic 
change in transitional regimes.
38. Rebecca M. Nelson and Jeremy M. Sharp, “Egypt and the IMF: Overview and Issues for Congress”, 
Congressional Research Service, April 29, 2013, p. 5. See also Shana Marshall and Joshua Stacher, “Egypt’s 
Generals and Transnational Capital”, Middle East Report 42 (266), Spring 2012 (http://www.merip.org/mer/
mer262/egypts-generals-transnational-capital). In the event, Egypt has received billions of dollars in finan-
cial assistance from the Gulf, with Qatar providing a majority of the funding, as well as from Libya. 
39. Government of Egypt, Ministry of Finance, “Budget Circular of the Fiscal Year 2013/2014” (http://
www.mof.gov.eg/MOFGallerySource/English/PDF/Circular2013-2014.pdf ). See also Mohsin 
Khan, “Egypt’s Economic Plan: Something Old, Something New”, EgyptSource, Rafik Hariri Center 
for the Middle East, Atlantic Council, November 30, 2012 (http://www.acus.org/egyptsource/
egypt%E2%80%99s-economic-plan-something-old-something-new). 
40. Alexandre Goudineau, “IMF and Egypt: No News is More of the Same”, Egypt Independent, April 22, 2013 
(http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/imf-and-egypt-no-news-more-same). 
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Within these constraints, the rise and reversal of redistributive policies under-
scores the shared logics of regime survival that have shaped the economic policy 
responses of Arab governments confronted with the revival of mass politics. It 
illustrates their shared capacity to adapt economic policies in response to new 
challenges, not least the tension between markets and economic justice as a driver 
of mass mobilization. Indeed, the legacies of the Arab Spring are almost certain 
to include a sharpening of that tension, a shift in the balance of power between 
citizens and regimes in defining the limits of liberalization and the appropriate 
role of the state as a provider of economic security. Issues of economic justice 
have returned to the political agenda of the Arab world, and regime survival 
will require all Arab leaders to adapt how they respond to ongoing demands for 
distributive justice, economic inclusion, and accountability.
What this article has shown, however, is that there is little basis for concluding 
that authoritarian survivors will be any less capable of meeting these challenges 
than the elected government in Tunisia – the only post-Arab Spring country to 
remain in transition. Indeed, as we have seen in the Egyptian case, the pressures 
of balancing markets and economic justice, of managing the intense economic 
grievances that have sustained high levels of popular mobilization across the region, 
may well drive transitional regimes to emulate their authoritarian predecessors.
This is not an argument about the permanence of authoritarianism in the Arab 
world. Though often misread by its critics, the literature on authoritarian persis-
tence and resilience never argued that the Middle East was doomed to a future 
of permanent authoritarian rule. Rather, it sought to explain how it was possible 
for a cluster of authoritarian regimes to survive for so long, despite the presence 
of virtually all of the factors that have been used to explain the breakdown of 
authoritarianism in other world regions. One of the most important arguments to 
emerge from this literature highlighted how regimes that appeared to be insular, 
rigid, and unyielding in their grip on power were in fact more dynamic, adaptable, 
and capable of adjusting their tactics than might have been evident at first glance. ■
Steven Heydemann holds the Janet W. Ketcham 1953 Chair in Middle East Studies at Smith 
College and is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution Center for Middle 
East Policy. He is a political scientist who specializes in the comparative politics and the 
political economy of the Middle East, with a particular focus on Syria. His interests include 
authoritarian governance, economic development, social policy, political and economic 
reform and civil society. From 2003 to 2007, he directed the Center for Democracy and 
Civil Society at Georgetown University. From 1997 to 2001, he was an associate professor 
in the department of political science at Columbia University. Earlier, from 1990-1997, he 
directed the Social Science Research Council’s Program on International Peace and Security 
























































nloaded on 23/03/2021 from
 w
w
w
.cairn-int.info (IP
: 73.4.114.249)
